

The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

ALVIN GREENBERG, MICHAEL STEINBERG, JULIE HANSON, CHRISTINA KING, and RONNELL ROBERTSON, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

V.

AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

No. 2:21-CV-00898-RSL

AMAZON'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER UNDER RULE 26(c)(1)

**NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
December 18, 2024**

Oral Argument Requested

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1 Defendant Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) moves pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1) for a
 2 protective order precluding discovery into products and transactions beyond those that are the
 3 subject of Plaintiffs’ individual claims.¹ The requested order is necessary given Plaintiffs’
 4 insistence that discovery extend to *all* products and transactions on Amazon.com during an eight-
 5 year period. That proposed scope is unsupported by either the substance of Plaintiffs’ individual
 6 claims or any legally-cognizable class definition (as explained in Amazon’s Motion to Strike
 7 (Dkt. 73)). To be clear, Amazon does not propose limiting discovery relevant to Plaintiffs’
 8 individual claims or to Amazon’s pricing practices generally, including its response to price
 9 gouging during the COVID-19 pandemic (the “Pandemic”).

10 **I. INTRODUCTION**

11 Plaintiffs’ discovery demands are overbroad and disproportionate to the needs of this
 12 case. Plaintiffs allege that they paid “unfair” prices for nine products they purchased from
 13 Amazon.com during the Pandemic, each of which allegedly was essential to their health or safety
 14 and unavailable for purchase elsewhere. On the basis of these limited allegations, Plaintiffs
 15 demand discovery about *every transaction* and *every product* sold on Amazon.com over the last
 16 eight years, regardless of whether those products were essential goods, were ever the subject of
 17 shortages, or could conceivably fit Plaintiffs’ theory of price gouging. There are *tens of billions*
 18 of these transactions, and virtually all of them are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ claims.

19 Plaintiffs’ sole justification for requesting information about products they did not buy is
 20 their proposed class definition, which includes all persons who purchased any consumer good or
 21 food item on Amazon.com during the Pandemic at an “unfair level.” But as described in
 22 Amazon’s pending motion to strike, that definition is facially improper because it (i) is an
 23 impermissible “fail-safe” class, (ii) fails to give the requisite notice of the criteria for class
 24 membership, and (iii) cannot satisfy Rule 23’s predominance requirement. Given those defects,
 25 the proposed class definition cannot justify the unbounded discovery Plaintiffs seek.

26 27 ¹ Amazon reserves all rights and defenses with respect to Plaintiffs’ class discovery requests to the extent the Court
 denies the Motion to Strike and permits some class discovery to move forward.

1 Even if Plaintiffs' class definition were to survive Amazon's motion to strike, Plaintiffs
 2 still could not establish the relevance of the requested discovery. Plaintiffs' claims, as pled and
 3 addressed by the Washington Supreme Court and this Court, are premised on allegations that (i)
 4 Amazon's pricing of essential goods was unfair; and (ii) Plaintiffs could not have reasonably
 5 avoided their alleged injury (a required element of their Consumer Protection Act ("CPA")
 6 claims) by purchasing the goods elsewhere. Accordingly, even if Plaintiffs could plead viable
 7 class claims, the only potentially relevant transactions would be purchases of essential goods that
 8 were unavailable from other retailers. Yet Plaintiffs have repeatedly refused to limit their
 9 discovery requests to essential goods, or to even define what they consider an essential good.
 10 That is deeply problematic because the vast majority of products sold on Amazon.com cannot be
 11 considered "essential" under any reasonable definition of that term (e.g., jewelry, home décor, or
 12 books). As a result, the bulk of the information Plaintiffs seek is irrelevant even to their class
 13 claims. If the Court permits discovery into products other than those Plaintiffs purchased, it
 14 should require Plaintiffs to identify the specific "essential" products they claim are at issue.

15 Moreover, even if Plaintiffs identify categories of allegedly essential goods, Plaintiffs'
 16 requests would impose an undue burden on Amazon by requiring it to spend an exceptionally
 17 disproportionate number of hours trying to determine which of its billion-plus products fall into
 18 each category. For example, Amazon estimates that it would need to spend 1,266,666 hours (or
 19 approximately 145 years) manually determining which of the more than 76 million ASINs
 20 nominally described as "face masks" on Amazon.com (including Halloween, ski, and skincare
 21 masks) are actually within scope—a process Plaintiffs want Amazon to repeat for each of the 1.5
 22 billion products they allege are sold on Amazon.com. Plaintiffs and Amazon would also need to
 23 obtain discovery from every third-party retailer related to the availability and pricing of each of
 24 those items so a factfinder could assess whether the purchases on Amazon.com were reasonably
 25 avoidable. Amazon has begun that process, issuing notice for subpoenas to 145 retailers that
 26 sold the consumer goods or food items named in the SAC. But there are many thousands of
 27 retailers that offer other consumer goods or food items that Plaintiffs may consider "essential."

1 For these reasons, discovery at this stage should be limited to the products that Plaintiffs
 2 actually purchased and their allegations about price gouging on Amazon.com, but should exclude
 3 discovery that is *exclusively* related to claims of absent putative class members. The parties are
 4 moving forward with the former discovery now. If discovery were permitted to go forward on
 5 products other than those purchased by Plaintiffs, at a minimum, it should be limited to goods
 6 Plaintiffs can show were essential to individuals' health and safety and unavailable elsewhere.

7 **II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND**

8 After the Washington Supreme Court rejected Plaintiffs' argument that they could show a
 9 CPA violation by pleading a specific percentage price increase, Plaintiffs filed the Second
 10 Amended Complaint ("SAC") alleging that they purchased a discrete set of nine allegedly
 11 essential products in March and April 2020 at prices allegedly higher than they were before the
 12 end of January 2020. SAC ¶¶ 20, 29, 36, 46, 48, 51, 56, 59, 65. Plaintiffs included a placeholder
 13 class definition, which they acknowledged would have to be "refined after discovery and expert
 14 analysis." SAC ¶ 130. Amazon moved to strike the class allegations under Rule 12(f) and to
 15 dismiss Plaintiffs' individual claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. 73. That motion argues, among
 16 other things, that Plaintiffs' class definition should be struck because it (a) is an impermissible
 17 "fail-safe" class, (b) fails to give the requisite notice of the criteria for class membership, and
 18 (c) cannot satisfy Rule 23's predominance requirement.

19 On September 13, 2024, Plaintiffs served their Second Set of Requests for Production
 20 (the "Requests"). Declaration of John Goldmark, Ex. A. The Requests seek an exceptionally
 21 broad set of information and documents for an eight-year period concerning the billion-plus
 22 products offered and tens of billions of sales made on Amazon.com. These products and sales
 23 could only be relevant to potential claims by proposed members of Plaintiffs' improperly-defined
 24 class, not Plaintiffs' claims themselves. This includes requests for "[a]ll transactional data for
 25 purchases made on Amazon.com" and "[a]ll data for product offers on Amazon.com" for the
 26 time period January 31, 2017 to the present, and "[a]ll documents or data concerning any cost
 27 increases or decreases Amazon incurred" during the Pandemic. *Id.* Request Nos. 11, 12 & 36.

1 Amazon responded and objected to the Requests. It agreed to produce documents in
 2 response to all but nine of Plaintiffs' 29 requests to the extent they relate to the Plaintiffs'
 3 individual claims or Amazon's general practices with respect to price gouging during the
 4 Pandemic. For eight of the requests, Amazon agreed to produce documents without any
 5 substantive limitation whatsoever. Goldmark Decl., Ex. B. The parties have met and conferred
 6 on multiple calls. Amazon has sought Plaintiffs' agreement to limit discovery concerning
 7 products that are not the subject of their claims or their specific transactions. Plaintiffs refused.

8 As Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged to the Washington Supreme Court, vast additional
 9 discovery will be necessary to assess the individual circumstances of each transaction. *See*
 10 Goldmark Decl., Ex. C, Tr. 00:24:38.23–00:24:58.09 ("I think we would put it on product by
 11 product ... I think an expert ... would analyze any geographic area Maybe there was an issue
 12 in Omaha, Nebraska; we don't know."). Amazon must pursue this discovery without delay; the
 13 current case schedule requires substantial completion of document production in April 2025 with
 14 discovery closing January 14, 2026. Dkt. 69. Although just beginning third-party discovery,
 15 Amazon has noticed 145 subpoenas seeking two categories of price and cost information from
 16 other retailers: first, a narrow set of information relating to the products Plaintiffs purchased at
 17 allegedly "unfair" prices, and second, information relating to all other (yet undefined) "consumer
 18 goods or food items" that Plaintiffs allege fall within their class definition. Goldmark Decl., Ex.
 19 D at 447-8. If discovery is narrowed to Plaintiffs' individual claims, Amazon will likewise limit
 20 the scope of any third-party discovery, as it has informed the subpoena recipients. *Id.*

21 **III. LEGAL STANDARD**

22 Under Rule 26(b)(1), "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
 23 that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case." Rule
 24 26(c)(1) permits the Court to, "for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from
 25 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." *In re Roman Catholic
 26 Archbishop of Portland in Or.*, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). The Rule "confers broad
 27 discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of

1 protection is required.” *Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart*, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). “Courts find
 2 good cause to issue protective orders when the discovery sought is irrelevant.” *Advanced Hair*
 3 *Restoration LLC v. Bosley Inc.*, 2024 WL 3833493, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2024); *Burrows*
 4 *v. 3M Co.*, 2023 WL 197250, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2023) (Lasnik, J.) (granting protective
 5 order limiting scope of Rule 30(b)(6) topics to reflect narrow scope of remaining issues).

6 IV. ARGUMENT

7 The Court should enter a limited protective order precluding discovery regarding
 8 products and transactions that fall outside of Plaintiffs’ substantive allegations or that are
 9 relevant only to Plaintiffs’ untenable class claims, while allowing discovery into Plaintiffs’
 10 individual claims to proceed. Discovery regarding *all* products and transactions on Amazon.com
 11 during the relevant period will never be relevant to this case. Pursuing such discovery will all
 12 but ensure that this case cannot be trial-ready on the current schedule. A protective order would
 13 prevent undue and disproportionate burden on Amazon and the scores of manufacturers,
 14 suppliers, and retailers it must subpoena to defend the untenable class claims. *See Advanced*
 15 *Hair Restoration*, 2024 WL 3833493, at *2. It would also promote the efficient litigation of
 16 these claims.

17 Amazon does not seek to stay discovery in this case. It has agreed to produce (and has
 18 begun to produce) extensive discovery relevant to Plaintiffs’ individual claims and discovery
 19 arguably relevant to both Plaintiffs’ individual and the proposed class claims, like documents and
 20 information regarding Amazon’s policies and practices with respect to price gouging. Amazon
 21 has done so even though it believes that all of Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed. *See* Dkt.
 22 73 at 13-23. Amazon requests only that the Court limit discovery to exclude information that is
 23 *exclusively* relevant to Plaintiffs’ unbounded proposed class “so as to conserve judicial resources
 24 by limiting unnecessary discovery.” *Ahern Rentals Inc. v. Mendenhall*, 2020 WL 8678084, at *2
 25 (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2020).

1 **A. Discovery Premised on Plaintiffs' Improperly Vague, Fail-Safe Class
2 Definition Is Overbroad and Disproportionate.**

3 Plaintiffs concede their class definition is merely a placeholder definition that will be
4 narrowed at some later stage of the litigation. Plaintiffs therefore cannot credibly dispute that an
5 unknown number of products and transactions about which they currently demand discovery will
6 ultimately be excluded from their class definition. Yet, Plaintiffs demand discovery into *every*
7 *transaction* and *every product* sold on Amazon.com over the last eight years based solely on
their flawed class definition. That is improper.

8 A party is only entitled to discovery “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R.
9 Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Plaintiffs’ claims are based on their purchase of just nine products in March
10 and April 2020, allegedly at prices higher than prevailed before the end of January 2020. *See*
11 *supra* at 3. They allege that those products were necessary *to them* based on their specific
12 circumstances and were not available for purchase elsewhere. For example, the SAC alleges that
13 Plaintiff King, who was immunocompromised, had a particular need for beef ramen noodles and
14 rice—purchases that, at least for the majority of Amazon customers, would have been purely
15 elective and easily avoided by simply selecting other food. *See* SAC ¶¶ 45–48. And it alleges
16 that Plaintiff Hanson purchased Zodiac Flea & Tick Spray because her daughter, who “like her
17 mother … generally stayed inside her home throughout the COVID-19 pandemic to protect
18 herself and particularly her diabetic son,” was facing “an outbreak of fleas” from a new kitten.
19 SAC ¶¶ 34–35. That Plaintiffs’ allegations are tethered to their individual health and safety
20 needs makes sense because the Washington Supreme Court allowed Plaintiffs to proceed with
21 their claims, in part, because “each plaintiff adequately alleged that their injuries were not
22 reasonably avoidable” because “they were unable to find *their essential goods* except for on
23 Amazon.” *Greenberg*, 3 Wn.3d at 462 (Keenan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

24 In contrast, the SAC contains no such allegations as to the *tens of billions* of other
25 transactions that occurred on Amazon.com during the Pandemic in which Plaintiffs did not
26 participate. Plaintiffs’ sole basis for seeking this disproportionate discovery is their legally
27 defective proposed class definition, which, because it is a fail-safe class, is over-inclusive and

1 includes transactions that Plaintiffs will later seek to exclude from the class. Yet, Plaintiffs'
 2 proposed class definition contains no "objective criteria" that would allow the parties or the
 3 Court to ascertain which of the tens of billions of transactions will remain within the class and
 4 which will be excluded. *Cashatt v. Ford Motor Co.*, 2020 WL 1987077, at *4 (W.D. Wash Apr.
 5 27, 2020); *see also* Dkt. 73 at 9–10. Plaintiffs are not entitled to require Amazon to produce
 6 information irrelevant to their pled claims so they can trawl that information in hopes of backing
 7 into an as-yet unpled theory of this case—a quintessential "fishing expedition." *See Bel Power*
 8 *Sols., Inc. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc.*, 2023 WL 2401926, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2023)
 9 (describing a request seeking information regarding all products where "not all[] products are at
 10 issue" as "little more than a 'fishing expedition'").

11 Plaintiffs have adequately pled no basis in fact or law that would make discovery of *all*
 12 products and transactions on Amazon.com, including factually unique transactions involving
 13 non-parties, relevant to their claims. Accordingly, good cause exists to limit discovery to the
 14 alleged wrongdoing actually pled in the SAC: price gouging with respect to specific products
 15 Plaintiffs purchased that were in short supply during the Pandemic.

16 **B. Discovery About Non-Essential or Otherwise Available Products Will Never
 17 Be Relevant to This Case.**

18 Even if Plaintiffs' class allegations are not struck, virtually all of their requested
 19 discovery is irrelevant. Plaintiffs' allegations focus, at their broadest, on products essential to
 20 individuals' health and safety that were priced "unfairly" and that they could not purchase
 21 elsewhere during the Pandemic. But Plaintiffs demand discovery about *every transaction* and
 22 *every product* sold on Amazon.com over the last eight years, regardless of whether those
 23 products relate to Plaintiffs' narrow allegations—and virtually all of these tens of billions of
 24 transactions and billions of products do not.

25 The scope of discovery is defined not by Plaintiffs' deficient class definition, but by the
 26 substance of their *claims*. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)*. Unlike their discovery requests,
 27 Plaintiffs' claims do not extend to all "consumer goods" and "food items" available on

1 Amazon.com during the Pandemic. Rather, they rest on the alleged unfair pricing of a narrower
 2 subset of such products: goods that were necessary to individuals' specific health and safety
 3 during the Pandemic and not available elsewhere. *See SAC ¶¶ 92* ("As the COVID-19 pandemic
 4 spread, Amazon's prices for many essential goods spiked dramatically."), 147 ("Amazon had a
 5 responsibility not to gouge consumers who turned to online retail increasingly as a means of
 6 obtaining essential goods safely during an escalating and alarming public health crisis.").

7 Plaintiffs have refused to limit their requests to match their allegations. Instead, they
 8 improperly seek discovery about every product offered on Amazon.com. But Plaintiffs' *claims*
 9 cannot reasonably be understood to encompass transactions in friendship bracelets, flower pots,
 10 sports memorabilia, or any of the billions of other products sold in Amazon's store that no
 11 person could rationally argue was ever necessary for health and safety during the Pandemic.
 12 Indeed, Plaintiffs' requests do not even relate to this key element or address whether any
 13 "essential" product was available for purchase from other retailers. Even if the Court were to
 14 find that discovery should encompass the broader (and undefined) category of "consumer goods"
 15 or "food items" sold at "unfair" prices in Plaintiffs' class definition, the discovery Plaintiffs seek
 16 into every product sold on Amazon.com would still include irrelevant products: Amazon.com
 17 lists for sale, for example, "industrial & scientific" products, such as lab and scientific
 18 equipment, industrial machines, professional dental supplies, and restaurant supplies and
 19 equipment.² Yet Plaintiffs insist that they are entitled to discovery on even these types of
 20 products, which are not sold for personal consumption and include out-of-scope products like
 21 "Set of 7 German Stainless Steel Dental EXTRACTING Forceps." Goldmark Decl., Ex. E. At a
 22 minimum, therefore, the scope of discovery must be confined to the subset of products that
 23 Plaintiffs can reasonably show were essential and unavailable except on Amazon.com.

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27 ² See Industrial & Scientific Products, AMAZON, available at <https://www.amazon.com/industrial-scientific-products/b?ie=UTF8&node=16310091>.

1 **C. Discovery Unbounded by Plaintiffs' Substantive Allegations or a Viable
2 Class Theory Would Impose Undue Burden on Amazon, the Court, and
3 Third Parties.**

4 Plaintiffs' insistence on conducting boundless discovery, without regard to their
5 substantive allegations or Ninth Circuit law on proper class definition, threatens to derail this
6 litigation from the outset. Without any limiting principle, discovery is on the precipice of
7 devolving into a vast enterprise investigating the facts and circumstances of countless
8 transactions in an unknown number of different products. The burden of such discovery on
9 Amazon, the Court, and third parties would be immense. It would also be wildly
10 disproportionate to the needs of the case given Plaintiffs' more limited specific allegations.

11 ***Discovery into "All Products" Sold on Amazon.com Is Disproportionate.*** Plaintiffs are
12 entitled only to discovery that is "proportional to the needs of the case." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
13 The Washington Supreme Court made clear that this includes the nine products alleged in the
14 SAC and, at most, goods that could be alleged to have been necessary for other individuals'
15 health and safety. But Plaintiffs seek information regarding "all products" sold on Amazon.com,
16 without limitation, and have refused to provide a definition of "consumer goods" or otherwise
17 limit their requests in any meaningful way. Indeed, Plaintiffs have taken the position during
18 meet-and-confers that lab beakers and professional dental supplies are consumer goods that
19 could have been necessary for some individuals' personal health and safety during the Pandemic.
20 Plaintiffs have repeatedly rejected Amazon's proposals to tailor discovery in favor of this
21 disproportionate "all" products approach.

22 ***The Burden of Identifying Relevant Data by Product Category Is Immense and
23 Unjustifiable.*** It is difficult to think of another putative class action in which the complaint did
24 not even identify the *products* allegedly at issue. Without doing so, Plaintiffs have left Amazon
25 with the unrealistic task of trying to identify products that *might* be at issue from among the
26 billions offered for sale on Amazon.com. Amazon does not categorize the products it sells as
27 "essential goods." Rather, as Plaintiffs were told in meet-and-confers, Amazon assigns each
unique product from each unique manufacturer an "Amazon Standard Identification Number"

1 (“ASIN”), which is publicly available on Amazon.com. Declaration of Kunal Dongre ¶¶ 4, 6.
 2 Amazon does not categorize all ASINs by product type. *Id.* ¶ 5. Accordingly, the process of
 3 identifying specific products that could be at issue given Plaintiffs’ allegations would be a
 4 necessarily manual endeavor: Amazon would have to conduct a labor and time-intensive
 5 exercise across billions of ASINs to determine whether each could be an “essential good” and
 6 whether each was or was not available elsewhere. *Id.* ¶¶ 7–10. And without some limiting
 7 principle from Plaintiffs, Amazon cannot predict which products Plaintiffs ultimately will try to
 8 put at issue in this case.

9 Even identifying “essential goods” would be an impracticable exercise. First, Amazon
 10 would have to guess which categories of products Plaintiffs deem “essential.” That task is
 11 complicated by references in the SAC to products that are obviously not essential, like yoga mats
 12 and whole elderberries. *See* SAC Appx. A. Then, for each category of “essential goods,”
 13 Amazon would need to identify which products fit in that category by manually examining each
 14 ASIN. Dongre Decl. ¶ 9. For example, to identify “face masks,” SAC ¶ 81, Amazon would
 15 need to review approximately 76 million of the 28.7 billion ASINs in Amazon’s US Catalog that
 16 include “face masks” in their product title (which includes all types of masks, including
 17 moisturizing masks, ski masks, and products that are used with masks but are not masks
 18 themselves, like rubber cushions for face masks and DIY face-mask-maker machines) and
 19 subjectively identify the products it thinks Plaintiffs mean. *Id.* ¶¶ 11–18. For each identified
 20 “face mask,” Amazon would then need to provide discovery into the product’s entire lifecycle,
 21 including: (i) the cost for acquiring the product; (ii) how the product was priced; (iii) who priced
 22 the product (third party or Amazon); (iv) the circumstances of the product purchase; (v) the
 23 shipping costs for the product; (vi) the replacement cost for the product; and (vii) whether the
 24 product was returned or a refund issued. And without naming specific products and naming only
 25 the broadest product categories, Plaintiffs will be free to dispute whether Amazon has identified
 26 all of the relevant ASINs, leading to a highly iterative discovery process replete with endless
 27 cycles and wasteful repetition.

1 Thousands of Non-Parties Will Be Forced into the Same Burdensome Exercise. If

2 Plaintiffs are allowed discovery into “all products,” Amazon will need to engage in broad
 3 discovery now to support its defense that its conduct was “reasonable in relation to the
 4 development and preservation of business.” *Greenberg*, 3 Wn.3d at 484 (Keenan, J., concurring)
 5 (quoting RCW 19.86.920). This includes obtaining evidence to demonstrate that the prices at
 6 issue were not “unfair” and that Amazon’s policies and practices were not in violation of any
 7 applicable duty of care. To do so, Amazon must obtain comparative data from the thousands of
 8 entities throughout the supply chain that manufacture, supply, and sell the billions of “consumer
 9 goods or food items” broadly implicated by Plaintiffs’ deficient class allegations. Amazon then
 10 must negotiate with these entities what products fit those descriptions. Amazon expects that
 11 these entities will argue to narrow the subpoenas’ scope, but as long as Plaintiffs continue to
 12 broadly define their class, Amazon needs the same scope of discovery from these third parties
 13 that Plaintiffs demand from Amazon. That third-party comparative data is critical to Amazon’s
 14 defenses and the factfinder’s ability to assess the “fairness” of the Amazon transactions. Given
 15 the magnitude of this task for Amazon, the third parties, and the expedited discovery schedule,
 16 Amazon cannot wait for resolution of the Motion to Strike to start this process. Accordingly,
 17 Amazon has noticed 145 subpoenas to retailers of “consumer goods or food items” and intends
 18 to subpoena additional manufacturers and suppliers. *See* Goldmark Decl., Ex. D. Amazon will
 19 appropriately limit those third-party discovery efforts if the Court grants this motion.

20 This Substantial Burden Will Permeate Discovery. This burden is inherent in Plaintiffs’

21 insistence on taking discovery based on their flawed class definition, and not limited to a few
 22 overbroad requests. Plaintiffs have not offered any path to define the terms “food items,”
 23 “consumer goods,” or “unfair prices” in their class definition, and thus have offered no
 24 reasonable limits on discovery. Just like their proposal to define their class later, they currently
 25 seek information on billions of transactions without regard to what products were necessary to
 26 individuals during the Pandemic and vaguely promise to define that category later. Amazon and
 27 third parties are left to play guessing games with Plaintiffs in a burden-shifting exercise that is

1 resource-intensive and time-consuming and will lead to delays. Narrowing discovery to
 2 information relevant to Plaintiffs' transactions avoids this pitfall and allows the case to proceed
 3 apace.

4 **D. Plaintiffs Would Face No Prejudice.**

5 If Plaintiffs' class allegations are struck from the SAC, Plaintiffs would suffer no
 6 prejudice from a protective order denying discovery to which they are not entitled. *See*
 7 *Advanced Hair*, 2024 WL 3833493 at *2; *Oppenheimer & Co. Inc. v. Mitchell*, 2023 WL
 8 4743909, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2023). Even if the allegations are not struck, Plaintiffs'
 9 class discovery goes well beyond that which their existing class definition entitles them; namely,
 10 discovery aimed at "consumer goods" or "food items" that Plaintiffs contend are "essential." If
 11 the Court believes Plaintiffs are entitled to such discovery now, it should require Plaintiffs to tell
 12 Amazon what Plaintiffs believe those terms mean and identify the specific ASINs (which are
 13 publicly available) that fall within those categories. Far from prejudicing Plaintiffs, such an
 14 exercise would increase efficiencies and ensure Plaintiffs get the discovery they need.

15 **V. CONCLUSION**

16 The Court should issue a protective order precluding discovery into billions of products
 17 not relevant to Plaintiffs' claims.

18 DATED this 4th day of December 2024.

19 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP

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LCR 26(c) CERTIFICATION OF CONFERRAL

I certify Amazon has engaged in multiple good faith efforts during meet and confer conferences with Plaintiffs' counsel to resolve the disputes at issue in Amazon's Motion for Protective Order. Most recently, I and Amazon's other counsel conferred with Plaintiffs' counsel on December 3, 2024, through video conference when the parties came to an impasse on the issues addressed in this Motion.

/s/ John A. Goldmark

John A. Goldmark